At a New Year news conference on January 5, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said that he would "engage in introspection" on World War II during his speech to be delivered on the 70th anniversary of Japan's unconditional surrender, and the speech would take a stance based on the "Tomiichi talks". The American side responded quickly. On January 6, Jen Psaki, spokesperson for the United States Department of State, said that the American side hopes that Abe will recognize the principles of the "Tomiichi talks" that acknowledge Japan's colonial rule and aggression and the "Kono statement" that apologizes for the "comfort women" system.

The above statements from Japan and the US suggest two obvious changes. Firstly, though Abe expressed that he would recognize the "Tomiichi talks" and "Kono statement" during his first term of office, once he took office for the second time in 2012 his conduct was the opposite. Now, at the beginning of his third term of office, he has committed to "introspection" on World War II. Whether this change in stance is genuine remains to be seen.

Secondly, the US usually stands back from the tense situation in northeast Asia caused by historical issues. Even if the US does not share the Japanese view, it rarely exerts any consistent political pressure on Japan. On the contrary, against a background of reducing military expenditure, the US encourages Japan to seek to lift the ban on collective self-defense within the framework of Treaty of Security and Safeguard between Japan and United States.

This time, the US has openly required that Japan recognize the principles of the "Tomiichi talks" and the "Kono statement" - a sharp contrast with its previous attitude. 　　

The US may have the following concerns: firstly, Abe's behavior and remarks on historical issues have caused unease on the American side. Anyway, how to perceive the history of World War II has much to do with the rationality of the global post-war interests the US has acquired. Secondly, as the American government is entering what is known as the presidential "lame duck" period, diplomatic achievements become more important. The US doesn't want any variables in this time.

Abe's reasons for "introspection" may be much more complicated. History has already taught us that Japan's introspection does not guarantee that it will acknowledge its aggressive war. Even if Japan adopts the terminology of the "Tomiichi talks" and the "Kono statement", its policies will not necessarily change. Perhaps, against a background of the 70th anniversary of the victory of the world anti-fascist war, Japan's primary motive is to avoid any moral interrogation.

In fact, the commitment to "introspection" and the pressure from the US are not consistent with Abe's state policy or the security roles played by Japan. In this sense, we should not expect too much of the "Abe speech" next August.